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PENAL LAW
Penal Law section 65.10: New York Court of Appeals holds that
probation condition requiring "CONVICTED DWI" sign on license
plate was penalty not reasonably related to probation
Probation is an alternative to incarceration which aims to
rehabilitate criminals so that they will lead law-abiding lives.2
'For a historical overview of the use of probation in the United States, see gen-
erally PAUL F. CROMWELL & GEORGE G. KILLENGER, COMMUNITY-BASED COR-
RECTIONS: PROBATION, PAROLE, AND INTERMEDIATE SANCTIONS (3d ed. 1994)
(describing procedures, practices, and personnel that constitute probation, parole
and other community-based correctional programs); GEORGE G. KILLINGER ET AL.,
PROBATION AND PAROLE IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (1976) (outlining legal
and social aspects of probation and parole and highlighting them as viable alterna-
tives to incarceration); ALEXANDER B. SMITH & LOUIS BERLIN, INTRODUCTION TO
PROBATION AND PAROLE (2d ed. 1979) (providing operational and theoretical ap-
proaches to probation and parole).
Probation grew out of the efforts to alleviate the severity of punishment de-
manded by the English common law. CROMWELL & KILLINGER supra. The modern
use and practice of probation in the United States is governed by statute. Id. at 15.
Today, all fifty states and the federal government have enacted probation statutes.
Id. at 13; see also Jeffrey C. Filcik, Signs of the Times: Scarlet Letter Probation Con-
ditions, 37 WASH. U. J. URB & CONTEMP. L. 291, 294 n.11 (1990) (listing probation
statutes). In New York, probation is governed by Penal Law § 65.00 which states in
pertinent part:
1.(a)... the court may sentence a person to a period of
probation upon conviction of any crime if the court,
having regard to the nature and circumstances of the
crime and to the history, character and condition of the defendant, is of
the opinion that:
(i) Institutional confinement for the term authorized
by law of the defendant is or may not be necessary for the protection
of the public;
(ii) the defendant is in need of guidance, training or
other assistance which, in his case, can be
effectively administered through probation
supervision; and
(iii) such disposition is not inconsistent with the ends of justice.
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 65.00 (McKinney 1987 & Supp. 1996).
2 Sentencing is concerned with the prevention of future crimes by helping the
defendant learn to live productively within the community. American Bar Associa-
tion Project on Standards for Criminal Justice: STANDARDS RELATING TO PRO-
BATION 1 (Approved Draft 1970) [hereinafter A.B.A. STANDARDS]. The goal of penal
law is to reform criminals and to prevent crime, not to punish out of malice or re-
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Although the primary goal of probation is rehabilitation,3 proba-
tion conditions may also have punitive and deterrent effects.
venge. CROMWELL & KILLINGER, supra note 1, at 11 (quoting JOHN AUGUSTUS,
FIRST PROBATION OFFICER 23 (Natl Probation Ass'n ed., 1939)). Probation "is a
method of offering an offender an opportunity to rehabilitate himself, without insti-
tutional confinement, under the supervision of a probation officer and the continu-
ing power of the court to use a more stringent sanction in the event the opportunity
is abused." WILLIAM C. DONNINO, PRACTICE COMMENTARIES, N.Y. PENAL LAW ART.
65, 204 (McKinney 1987) (quoting Staff Notes of the Commission on Revision of Pe-
nal Law, reprinted in PROPOSED N.Y. PENAL LAW 260 (McKinney's Special Pamphlet
1964).
"The conditions of probation and of conditional discharge shall be such as the
court, in its discretion, deems reasonably necessary to insure that the defendant will
lead a law-abiding life or to assist him to do so." N.Y. PENAL LAW § 65.10(1)
(McKinney 1987 & Supp. 1996).
3 See, e.g., United States v. Sullivan, 421 F. Supp. 300, 302 (S.D.N.Y. 1976)
("The grant of probation instead of immediate incarceration is intended to allow a
defendant an opportunity to rehabilitate himself."); State v. Turner, 891 P.2d 317,
321 (Kan. 1995) ("The primary purpose of probation is the successful rehabilitation
of the offender."); Commonwealth v. Power, 650 N.E.2d 87, 90 (Mass. 1995) ("The
primary goal[] of a probationary sentence [is] rehabilitation of the probationer .... ");
State v. Lockwood, 632 A.2d 655, 659 (Vt. 1993) ("Probation is intended to allow a
defendant an opportunity for rehabilitation .... ").
4 See Jon A. Brilliant, Note, The Modern Day Scarlet Letter: A Critical Analysis
of Modern Probation Conditions, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1357, 1357-58 (1989). Probation
has traditionally been viewed as an alternative to incarceration. Courts granted
probation to defendants who were considered to be reformable and the "purpose,
justification and goal has been the defendanfs rehabilitation." Filcik, supra note 1,
at 295. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 65.10 states:
1. In general. The conditions of probation ... shall be such as the court, in
its discretion, deems reasonably necessary to insure that the defendant
will lead a law-abiding life or to assist him to do so.
2. Conditions relating to conduct and rehabilitation. When
imposing a sentence of probation ... the court ... may, as a condition of sen-
tence, require that the defendant...
(1) satisfy any other conditions reasonably related to his
rehabilitation ....
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 65.10 (McKinney 1987 & Supp. 1996) (emphasis added).
When N.Y. PENAL LAW § 65.10 was enacted in 1965, the prevailing penological
theory was that offenders could be "cured" of their criminal tendencies. See People
v. Letterlough, 86 N.Y.2d 259, 265 n.2, 655 N.E.2d 146, 149 n.2, 631 N.Y.S.2d 105,
108 n.2 (1995). If probation had punitive or deterrent effects, they were incidental to
the offender's rehabilitation. Id. at 265, 655 N.E.2d at 149, 631 N.Y.S.2d at 109. The
most obvious deterrent effect of probation is that it is revocable if the probationer
commits another offense or violates the terms of probation. See N.Y. PENAL LAW §
65.00(2) (McKinney 1987 & Supp. 1996).
"Probation is an affirmative correctional tool, a tool which is used not because it
is of maximum benefit to the defendant ... but because it is of maximum benefit to
the society which is sought to be served by the sentencing of criminals." A.B.A.
STANDARDS, supra note 2, at 1. A new model of probation as a sentence in itself de-
veloped in response to factors such as the perceived failure of treatment programs
to stem recidivism, early release of prisoners mandated by constitutional challenges
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Courts and legal commentators disagree about the extent to
which rehabilitation, punishment, and deterrence may coexist in
judicially-designed probation programs.' Recently, in People v.
Letterlough,6 the New York Court of Appeals held that a proba-
tion condition requiring a defendant convicted of driving while
intoxicated (hereinafter "DWI") to affix a "CONVICTED DWI"
sign on the license plate of any vehicle he drove was a penalty
not reasonably related to probation.
Letterlough plead guilty to a felony charge of operating a
motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol.7 In a negoti-
to prison overcrowding, and recognition that it was often cheaper for society to
maintain offenders in the community than in prison. See Filcik, supra note 1, at
296-300. The use of probation as a sentencing tool permits courts to impose condi-
tions that are primarily punitive or deterrent, but a court's authority to impose such
non-rehabilitative sanctions, however, may be limited by the language or intent of
the probation statute. See id. at 299 n31 (comparing probation statutes throughout
the United States).
5 Some legal writers reject public notification probation conditions ("scarlet let-
ter provisions") as being unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment (cruel and
unusual punishment), the Fifth Amendment (double jeopardy), Article I, Section 9,
Clause 3 and Article I, Section 10, Clause 1 (ex post facto laws), and Fourth, Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments (construed to create right to privacy). See, e.g., Bril-
liant, supra note 4; Michelle Pia Jerusalem, Note, A Framework for Post-Sentence
Sex Offender Legislation: Perspectives on Prevention, Registration, and the Public's
'Right' to Know, 48A VAND. L. REV. 219 (1995); Toni M. Massaro, Shame, Culture,
and American Criminal Law 89 MICH. L. REV. 1880 (1991); Jenny A. Montana,
Note, An Ineffective Weapon in the Fight Against Child Sexual Abuse: New Jersey's
Megan's Law, 3 J.L. & POLY 569 (1995); Leonore H. Tavill, Note, Scarlet Letter Pun-
ishment: Yesterday's Outlawed Penalty is Today's Probation Condition, 36 CLEv. ST.
L. REV. 613 (1988). These authors discussed penological goals and concluded that,
even if scarlet letter provisions passed constitutional challenges, they were unlikely
to effectively modify criminal behavior.
Other commentators found that scarlet letter provisions were valid if they were
reasonably related to probationary goals. See, e.g., Brian C. Erb, Creative Probation
Conditions: Putting the "Unusual' Back in 'Cruel and Unusual' After Bateman, 24
WILLAAMTTE L. REV. 1155 (1988); Filcik, supra note 1; Recent Legislation, Criminal
Law-Sex Offender Notification Statute, 108A HARv. L. REV. 787 (1995); Rosalind K.
Kelley, Comment, Sentenced to Wear the Scarlet Letter: Judicial Innovations in Sen-
tencing-Are They Constitutional?, 93 DICK. L. REV. 759 (1989); Jaimy M. Levine,
Comment, 'Join the Sierra Club!. Imposition of Ideology as a Condition of Proba-
tion, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1841 (1994).
6 86 N.Y.2d 259, 655 N.E.2d 146, 631 N.Y.S.2d 105 (1995).
7 Id. at 261, 655 N.E.2d at 147, 631 N.Y.S.2d at 106 (convicted under precursor
to N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1192 (2,3) (McKinney 1986 & Supp. 1996)). Letter-
lough's five previous alcohol related offenses included two guilty pleas of driving
while impaired (plea bargains for DWI arrests) and three guilty pleas of DWI. Pre-
vious penalties included fines, a 90 day jail term, and suspensions of his driver's li-
cense. Id. at 270-71, 655 N.E.2d at 152, 631 N.Y.S.2d at 111 (Bellacosa, J., dissent-
ing).
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ated plea agreement, he was sentenced to five years probation, a
$500 fine, license revocation, and ordered to obtain treatment for
alcohol abuse.8 The sentencing court imposed an additional pro-
bation condition which required Letterlough to attach fluores-
cent signs stating "CONVICTED DWI" to the license plate of any
vehicle he drove if his license was restored at any time during
the probation period.9
The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the Appellate
Division, Second Department. ° Judge Titone, writing for the
majority, held that the probation condition was punitive and de-
terrent, and therefore not "reasonably related to the defendant's
rehabilitation."1" The court found that the sign was a punish-
ment that was "outside the authority of the court to impose."'
In finding that the probation condition was not reasonably
related to rehabilitation, the court stated that "[t]he focus of re-
habilitation is primarily on healing the individual."3 The court
reasoned that Letterlough's conduct was caused by his abuse of
alcohol and found that the sign was not a method of treatment of
the underlying cause of his drinking and driving.'4 In the court's
view, the sign was the equivalent of a "scarlet letter,"5 a histori-
8 Id. at 261, 655 N.E.2d at 147, 631 N.Y.S.2d at 106.
9Id.
'0 People v. Letterlough, 205 A.D.2d 803, 613 N.Y.S.2d 687 (2d Dep't 1994),
rev'd, 86 N.Y.2d 259, 655 N.E.2d 146, 631 N.Y.S.2d 105 (1995).
" People v. Letterlough, 86 N.Y.2d 259, 261, 655 N.E.2d 146, 147, 631 N.Y.S.2d
105, 106 (1995). The majority relied on N.Y. PENAL LAW § 65.10(2), which includes a
catch-all provision requiring the defendant to "[s]atisfy any other conditions rea-
sonably related to his rehabilitation." See also N.Y. PENAL LAW § 65.10(2)(1)
(McKinney 1987 & Supp. 1996). The court explained that when § 65.10 was enacted
in 1965, the legislators were probably influenced by the penological theory that of-
fenders could be "cured" of their criminal tendencies, and rehabilitation therefore
consisted of primarily non-punitive methods. Letterlough, 86 N.Y.2d at 265 n.2, 655
N.E.2d at 149 n.2, 631 N.Y.S.2d at 108 n.2.
12 Id. at 261, 655 N.E.2d at 147, 631 N.Y.S.2d at 106.
13 Id. at 262, 655 N.E.2d at 148, 631 N.Y.S.2d at 107. "Create in me a clean
heart, 0 God; and renew a right spirit within me." Psalm 51:10. "[N]o one, not even
the scrutinizing officers, could have believed that he was the same person who less
than a month before, had stood trembling on the prisoner's stand." PATTERSON
SMITH, JOHN AUGUSTUS: FIRST PROBATION OFFICERS 5 (1972) (describing transfor-
mation of his first probationer).
1 Letterlough, 86 N.Y.2d at 264, 655 N.E.2d at 148, 631 N.Y.S.2d at 107; see
People v. Berkley, 152 A.D.2d 788, 789, 543 N.Y.S.2d 568, 570 (3d Dep't 1989)
(requiring five-time DWI offender to stop drinking alcohol as condition of probation
because "consumption of alcohol, in combination with his operation of a motor vehi-
cle, is the sole precipitating factor of his contact with the criminal justice system").
"' NATHANIEL HAwTHoRNE, THE SCARLET LETTER (First Vintage Books 1990)
[Vol. 70:421
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cal stigma whose punitive effects outweighed any rehabilitative
effect.16 The court concluded that the legislature, and not the
courts, was empowered to impose criminal penalties." The court
noted that the legislature's failure to adopt a bill, which would
have authorized the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles to investi-
gate the feasibility of using special license plates to identify for-
mer DWI offenders, was evidence of the legislature's disavowal
of that solution. 8
(immortalizing red letter "A" that adulteress was required to wear as symbol of herguilt).
16 Letterlough, 86 N.Y.2d 259, 266, 655 N.E.2d 146, 150, 631 N.Y.S.2d 105, 109;
see supra note 5 (listing law review articles which discuss the history of scarlet let-
ter provisions).
SId. at 266-67, 655 N.E.2d at 150, 631 N.Y.S.2d at 109; see People v. Day, 73
N.Y.2d 208, 210, 535 N.E.2d 1325, 1327, 538 N.Y.S.2d 785, 786 (indicating that
"legislative policy choice governing the exercise of judicial sentencing authority is
rooted in the statutory words and definitions ....").
18 Letterlough, 86 N.Y.2d at 267 n5, 655 N.E.2d at 150 n.5, 631 N.Y.S.2d at 109
n.5 (referring to proposed legislation Senate Bill 4861 (1983)).
The majority found that New York's adoption of a program which required con-
victed DWI offenders to install ignition interlock devices, in conjunction with the
state's failure to enact the special license plate law, precluded courts from requiring
the plates. Id. at 268-69, 655 N.E.2d at 151, 631 N.Y.S.2d at 110. In 1988, New York
created a pilot ignition interlock device program for Albany, Erie, Nassau,
Onondaga, Monroe, Westchester, and Suffolk counties. Interlock devices prevent
vehicles from starting if the operator's blood alcohol level, as measured by a breath
sample, exceeds the device's calibration level. See Ignition Interlock Device Pro-
gram, ch. 713, § 1198, 1988 N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAWS (McKinney Supp. 1996); see
also 1988 N.Y. Laws ch. 713 § 1 (1989). The program allowed DWI offenders who
installed the device to obtain restricted licenses. A provision stated that "[n]othing
contained herein shall prevent the court from applying any other conditions of pro-
bation allowed by law, including treatment for alcohol or drug abuse, restitution and
community service." N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1198(3)(e). The Department of Motor
Vehicles and Division of Probation and Correction Alternatives were to prepare a
report evaluating the effectiveness and impact of the devices as a probation option.
Id. § 1198(7). One month after Letterlough was decided, the legislature extended the
pilot program through July 1, 1997, and explicitly permitted its expansion into other
counties.
Over half of the states have permanent or pilot programs requiring DWI offend-
ers to install ignition interlock devices in order to obtain restricted driving licenses.
See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.102 (Michie 1993); CAL. VEH. CODE § 23246 (West
Supp. 1996); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 42-2-126.1 (West Supp. 1995); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 316.1937 (West Supp. 1996); GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2747 (Harrison Supp.
1993); IDAHO CODE § 18-8008 (Michie Supp. 1996); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 625, § 5/11-
501 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1996) (pilot program); IND. STAT. ANN. § 9-30-5-10 (Michie
Supp. 1996); IOWA CODE ANN. § 321J.4(7) (West Supp 1996); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 8-
262 (Supp. 1995); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32:378.2 (West Supp. 1996); MD. CODE
ANN., TRANSP. § 27-107 (Michie 1992); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 257.625(b)(8)
(West Supp. 1996); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 171.305 (pilot program) (West Supp. 1996);
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 577.600 (West Supp. 1996); NEB. REV. STAT. § 60-6, 211.05 (1993);
1996]
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Judge Bellacosa's dissent rejected the majority's narrow in-
terpretation of rehabilitation. He concluded that probation con-
ditions which had deterrent and punitive effects might neverthe-
less meet statutory criteria for rehabilitation. 9 The dissent
further emphasized that the criminal conduct was operating a
motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol.2' Letter-
lough's consumption of alcohol, which the majority focused on,
was simply not a criminal offense."' Additionally, the dissent ar-
gued that the sign would reinforce the message that drinking
and driving is criminal.2 ' This reinforcement was consistent
with the legislature's mandate to "insure that the defendant will
lead a law-abiding life or to assist him to do so.
"
,23
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-179.3 (Michie 1995); N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-06.1-11 (Michie
Butterworth Supp. 1995); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2951.02(G)(1) (Anderson 1995);
OR. REV. STAT. § 813.600 (1993); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 31-27-2(D)(2) (Michie Supp.
1995); TENN. CODE ANN. § 55-10-412 (Michie 1995); TEX CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN.
art. 42.12(13)(i) (Vernon Supp. 1996); UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6-44.7 (Michie Butter-
worth 1995); VA. CODE ANN. § 46.2-360(2) (Michie Supp. 1995); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 46.20.720 (West Supp. 1996); W. VA. CODE § 17C-5A-3a (Michie Butterworth
Supp. 1995); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 346.65 (West 1995).
Very few states have statutory requirements for special license plates, which
permit persons whose licenses have been revoked to obtain limited driving privi-
leges. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 168.041(6) (West 1986 & Supp. 1996); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 4503.231 (Baldwin 1994). Governor Weld of Massachusetts submitted
several proposals requiring convicted DWI offenders to carry distinctive symbols on
their licenses and license plates. No legislation was enacted. See Peter J. Howe,
Drunken Driving Charges Decline, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 27, 1992, at 33; Editorial,
We Need More Against DWI, BOSTON HERALD, Dec. 11, 1995, at 24.
'9 Letterlough, 86 N.Y.2d at 272-73, 655 N.E.2d at 153, 631 N.Y.S.2d at 112
("Rehabilitation and punishment are not mutually exclusive goals or concepts in
these circumstances, either under the governing statute or under progressive pe-
nological theory and practice."). Id. at 270, 655 N.E.2d at 152, 631 N.Y.S.2d at 111
(Bellacosa, J., dissenting). An "inclusive theory of punishment" blends elements of
prevention (specific deterrence), incapacitation, rehabilitation, general deterrence,
education and retribution to achieve penological goals. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE &
AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., CRIMINAL LAW 22-7 (2d ed. 1986) (quoting J. Hall, GENERAL
PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 308 (2d ed. 1960)).
The judges' contrasting views of the court's authority under N.Y. PENAL LAW §
65.10 illustrate the tension between permitting courts discretion to fashion sen-
tences which account for the idiosyncracies of the offender and utilizing uniform
sentencing guidelines to avoid arbitrary or capricious sentences. See id.
20 See Letterlough, 86 N.Y.2d at 273, 655 N.E.2d at 154, 631 N.Y.S.2d at 113.
21 Id. at 273, 655 N.E.2d at 154, 631 N.Y.S.2d at 113 ("The Penal Law does not
criminalize drinking; nor is it a crime to have a drinking problem.").
Id. at 274, 655 N.E.2d at 154, 631 N.Y.S.2d at 113.
2Id. (quoting N.Y. PENAL Law § 65.10(1)). Judicially-imposed DWI notification
provisions have been upheld in a few Southern states. See Lindsay v. State, 606 So.
2d 652 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992), review denied, 618 So. 2d 209 (Fla. 1993)
(newspaper advertisement); Ballenger v. State, 436 S.E.2d 793 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993)
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(fluorescent bracelet); Goldschmitt v. Florida, 490 So. 2d 123 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.),
review denied, 496 So. 2d 142 (Fla. 1986) (bumper sticker); see also Drunk Driver
Must Buy Ad to Publicize Crime, S. F. CHRON., Nov. 3, 1992, at All (stating Cali-
fornia court upheld newspaper advertisement with photograph of DWI offender and
indicating hundreds of photos of DWI offenders had been published); Nicole Foy,
DWI Car Stickers Cited as Deterrent to Driving Drunk, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-
NEWS, Sept. 23, 1995 (profiling new judicially-created program making DWI offend-
ers place bright yellow bumper stickers with "Driving While Intoxicated" legend on
cars); Henry J. Reske, Scarlet Letter Sentences, A.B.A. J., Jan. 1996, at 16. The pro-
gram is in force in one Texas county; another county has a similar program. Judge
Crouch stated, "There were challenges reprinted in PROPOSED NEW YORK PENAL
LAW 266 (McKinney's Special Pamphlet 1964) "The discretionary conditions set
forth in [§ 65.10(2)] are by and large the same as those ... recommended in the
Model Penal Code (P.O.D., § 301.1)." Id. at 267.
The Staff Notes are ambiguous in that they encompass both the majority's con-
clusion that only rehabilitative methods lead to rehabilitative goals and the dissenefs
argument that deterrent or punitive methods may be permissible to achieve reha-
bilitative goals.
2 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Power, 650 N.E.2d 87 (Mass. 1995), cert. denied,
Power v. Massachusetts, _ U.S. -, 116 S.Ct. 697 (1996) (finding First Amendment
rights not violated by condition precluding probationer from profiting from sale of
her story); State v. Turner, 891 Pin the beginning, but it came back fine. The only
criteria is that it must be consistent." Foy, supra (quoting County Court-at-Law No.
8 Judge Karen Crouch).
New Yorkers are very concerned about drunk driving, and New York's interlock
program and the Letterlough decisions were the subjects of legislative debate and
various newspaper articles. See, e.g., Memorandum of Assemblyman Graber, re-
printed in 1988 N.Y. LEGIS. ANN. 288; Court Says Judge's 'Scarlet Letter' Require-
ment Not Legal, ASSOCIATED PRESS, June 13, 1995; Evan Davis, Dissents, DWI and
Taxing Catalog Sales, N.Y. L.J., July 13, 1995, at 3 (concluding Court's disagree-
ment over DWI sign shows conflict over meaning of rehabilitation in "context of an-
tisocial conduct caused by addiction"); Beth J. Harpaz, 'Scarlet Letter' License Plate
for Convicted Driver, ASSOCIATED PRESS, July 7, 1994, available in 1994 WL
10127461 (indicating that judge required DWI sign in five to ten previous cases);
David N. Kelley, Safety; How Do We Keep Drunk Drivers Off the Road? Cars Are Le-
thal Weapons When A Drunk Is Behind The Wheel, NEWSDAY, May 15, 1994, at A35
(member of Mothers Against Drunk Driving describing educational and punitive
strategies); Thomas F. Liotti, 'Scarlet Letter' Sentence Criticized, N.Y.L.J., July 20,
1994, at 2 (President of N.Y.S. Ass'n of Criminal Defense Lawyers criticizing 2d
Dep't decision with rationale used by Court of Appeals majority); Shirley E.
Perlman, Undercover Sting Drives Home the Point, NEWSDAY, June 3, 1994, at A30
(noting that 12 of 20 probationers caught driving without licenses had their licenses
revoked for DWI); Hon. Ira J. Raab, Viewpoints: Judge Has the Right Idea,
NEWSDAY, Aug. 9, 1995, at A34 (Governor of N.Y. District of Am. Judges Ass'n sup-
porting use of DWI sign and stating "Public service, restitution, house arrest, elec-
tronic leg bracelets and diversionary medication were innovative rehabilitation and
deterrent ideas before the Legislature wrote them into law"); Summary of Actions in
New York Legislature's 1988 Session, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 26, 1988, at 38; Michele Sal-
cedo, Testing DWI Ignition Lock, NEWSDAY, Jan. 1, 1994, at 13 (indicating that five
years elapsed from time pilot program was authorized until interlock devices meet-
ing N.Y.S. Health Dep't standards were developed); Viewpoints: Worth a Try,
NEWSDAY, July 14, 1994, at A32 (supporting 2d Dep't decision).
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It is submitted that the Letterlough majority's narrow in-
terpretation of Penal Law section 65.10 unnecessarily restricts
trial judges' ability to use creative sentencing to help offenders
become law-abiding members of the community.' Generally,
courts have held that probation conditions which are reasonably
related to the goals of sentencing and probation are not unconsti-
tutional per se, even when they restrict a probationer's funda-
mental rights, provided the conditions do not exceed punishment
limits provided by statute.' It is asserted that a valid goal of
sentencing and probation is simply to keep the defendant from
returning to jail, whether the goal is achieved through the inter-
nal restraint of rehabilitation, or the external restraints of deter-
rence or punishment.26 As a result, probationers, because of
their status as convicted criminals, may be subject to conditions
that would be declared unconstitutional if applied to persons
who had not been convicted of a crime.27
24 "he list of conditions is not intended to be exhaustive of the permissible
conditions and, obviously, no legislative specification could enumerate all of the rea-
sonable measures that may be appropriate in dealing with the problems involved in
the rehabilitation of individual offenders." Staff Notes of the Commission on Revi-
sion of the Penal Law, reprinted in PROPOSED NEW YORK PENAL LAw 266
(McKinney's Special Pamphlet 1964) "'he discretionary conditions set forth in [§
65.10(2)] are by and large the same as those ... recommended in the Model Penal
Code (P.O.D., § 301.1)." Id. at 267.
The Staff Notes are ambiguous in that they encompass both the majority's con-
clusion that only rehabilitative methods lead to rehabilitative goals and the dissent's
argument that deterrent or punitive methods may be permissible to achieve reha-bilitative goals.
2See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Power, 650 N.E.2d 87 (Mass. 1995), cert. denied,
Power v. Massachusetts, __ U.S. -, 116 S.Ct. 697 (1996) (finding First Amendment
rights not violated by condition precluding probationer from profiting from sale of
her story); State v. Turner, 891 P.2d 317, 323 (Kan. 1995) (holding exclusionary rule
does not apply to probation revocation hearings); State v. Blanchard, 889 P.2d 1180,
1184 (Mont. 1995) (requiring defendant to make restitution for offenses he admitted
but was not convicted of).
26 Probationary goals will be met just as well if a non-repentant offender contin-
ues to have bad thoughts, provided the offender no longer commits criminal acts.
Part of the appeal of the ignition interlock system is that it works independently
from the offender's actual rehabilitation; it is an effective restraint even if the pro-
bationer attempts to drink and drive. See supra note 18.
27 See Young v. State, 692 S.W.2d 752, 755 (Ark. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S.
1070 (1986) (stating "a condition of a probation or suspension is not necessarily in-
valid simply because it restricts probationer's ability to exercise constitutionally
protected rights"). Traditionally, the standard of review of a probation condition has
been whether or not it was reasonably related to the crime committed or to future
criminality. See State v. Macy, 403 N.W.2d 743, 745 (S.D. 1987) ("The test is one of
reasonableness."); In re White, 158 Cal. Rptr. 562, 565 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979)
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A valid goal of rehabilitation is to motivate the offender to
comply with the minimal standards of acceptable community
conduct, as prescribed by the penal code, and not to hold the of-
fender to the court's standard of morally correct behavior or
"goodness."' As the dissent indicated, the Letterlough majority
would permit a total ban on driving and would compel Letter-
lough to attend an alcohol abuse program, presumably to control
his drinking.29 The majority found that a condition designed to
deter non-criminal consumption of alcohol was permissible as
rehabilitative," while a condition aimed at deterring criminal
behavior-drinking and driving-was impermissible because of
its non-rehabilitative nature.3
Penal Law section 65.10 gives sentencing courts discretion
to adopt measures that have a substantial punitive component. 2
(forbidding conduct not reasonably related to future criminality); Young, 692 S.W.2d
at 755 (stating probation conditions must be reasonably related to the crime com-
mitted or future criminality).
To assist in determining the constitutional validity of a probation condition, the
Ninth Circuit formulated a test, since adopted by various other courts, which con-
siders the following three factors: (1) the purpose to be served by probation; (2) the
extent to which constitutional rights enjoyed by law-abiding citizens should be ac-
corded to probationers; and (3) the legitimate needs of law enforcement. United
States v. Tonry, 605 F.2d 144, 150 (5th Cir. 1979). Recently, courts have been will-
ing to uphold conditions restricting a probationer's freedom from searches without a
warrant, freedom of speech, right to earn a living in their chosen field, and right to
holdpolitical office. Filcik, supra note 1, at 309.
See LAFAVRE & ScOTT, supra note 19, at 22 (declaring that criminal law aims
more to achieve minimum standard of conduct than to bring about ideal conduct).
Although immorality and criminality are related, they are not synonymous. Id. at
11. Additionally, while the penal law seeks to proscribe conduct which is unjustifi-
able to virtually everyone because it inexcusably causes or threatens substantial
harm to individual or public interests, N.Y. PENAL LAW §1.05(1) (McKinney 1987),
there are numerous moral issues on which the public is sharply divided, such as the
sale of intoxicating liquor. LAFAVRE & SCoT, supra note 19, at 11. But see People ex
rel. Fusco v. Ryan, 124 N.Y.S.2d 541, 543 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1953) (stating that
for rehabilitation to fit needs of offender, extent to which prisoner has responded to
efforts made to improve his moral condition must be determined); United States ex
rel. Sero v. Preiser, 506 F.2d 1115, 1117 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 921
(1975) (finding original purpose of reformatory sentence was to provide moral guid-
ance, education, and vocational training); People v. Vancol, 166 Misc. 2d 93, 96, 631
N.Y.S.2d 996, 998 (J. Ct. 1995) (articulating that goal of criminal law, to prevent
harm to health, safety, morals, and welfare of society, is accomplished by rehabili-
tating those who would do harm to others).
People v. Letterlough, 86 N.Y.2d 259, 266, 655 N.E.2d 146, 152, 631 N.Y.S.2d
105, 108 (1995).3' Id. at 266, 655 N.E.2d at 149, 631 N.Y.S.2d at 108.3' Id. at 266, 655 N.E.2d at 150, 631 N.Y.S.2d at 109.
32 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 65.10(1) (McKinney 1987) ("The conditions of proba-
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The court may require that the defendant avoid vicious or injuri-
ous habits,33 place restrictions on his freedom of association,'
and confine him for mandatory medical or psychiatric treat-
ment.35 The provision of the statute which requires the defen-
dant to "[slatisfy any other conditions reasonably related to his
rehabilitation"36 should not be read so narrowly as to preclude
the court from imposing other conditions which have punitive or
deterrent effects, provided they are reasonably related to reha-
bilitative goals.37
Some commentators have rejected "scarlet letter" conditions
tion.. .shall be such as the court, in its discretion, deems reasonably necessary to in-
sure that the defendant will lead a law-abiding life or to assist him to do so.").
"N.Y. PENAL LAW § 65.10(2)(a); see People v. Berkley, 152 A.D.2d 788, 789, 543
N.Y.S.2d 568, 570 (3d Dep't 1989) (requiring probationer to refrain from consump-
tion of alcohol).
34 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 65.10(2)(b) (McKinney 1987 & Supp. 1996) ("[T]he court
shall ... require that the defendant refrain from frequenting unlawful or disreputa-
ble places or consorting with disreputable persons."); see, e.g., People v. Howland,
145 A.D.2d 866, 867, 536 N.Y.S.2d 191, 192 (3d Dep't 1988) (restricting probationer's
right to associate with husband without court's permission); People v. Johnson, 118
Misc. 2d 983, 986, 462 N.Y.S.2d 549, 551 (Crim. Ct. Queens County 1983)
(restricting probationer from frequenting store which sells obscene films).3- N.Y. PENAL LAW § 65.10(2)(d); see, e.g., People v. Robinson, 85 Misc. 2d 815,
816, 380 N.Y.S.2d 543, 544 (Nassau County Ct. 1976) (requiring in-patient treat-
ment at secure drug abuse facility for period not to exceed one year); People v.
Buckley, 70 A.D.2d 772, 772, 417 N.Y.S.2d 352, 353 (4th Dep't 1979) (requiring de-
fendant receive psychiatric counseling from licensed psychiatrist).
36 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 65.10(2)(1) (McKinney 1987 & Supp. 1996).
37 See A.B.A. STANDARDS, supra note 2, at 46 ("Probation conditions prove
themselves to be of the greatest utility when they are designed to meet the particu-
lar needs of individual cases .... [A] policy of fixing by legislative act terms to meet
all cases which may conceivably arise will prove to be impractical, inadequate, and
often injurious."); see also Brilliant, supra note 4, at 1378-79. Brilliant, in his article,
proffers that courts should accept the fact that although certain probation condi-
tions contain punitive elements, their goal of rehabilitation still may be met. Id. He
states:
[Olne of the aims of rehabilitation [is] specific deterrence .... [R]equiring a
drunk driver to place a bumper sticker on her car ... also serves the goal of
rehabilitation. Every time the driver gets into her car, the bumper sticker
will remind her of the criminal conviction, and she will give notice to eve-
ryone who reads her bumper of that conviction ... . [Sihe may choose not to
drive in order to avoid subjecting herself to humiliation or embarrassment.
This result would be ideally rehabilitative since it completely deters the
probationer from driving ... . [I]f she chooses to drive, the bumper sticker
may remind her constantly of her offense, reinforce the gravity of her of-
fense, and encourage her to refrain from drunk driving .... [T]he punitive
aspect does not outweigh the strong rehabilitative or deterrent effects of
the condition.
Id. at 1379 (footnote omitted).
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as unconstitutional punishments,38 or have contended that public
notification is an ineffectual tool for curbing criminal behavior. 9
Others, applying a reasonableness test, have found scarlet letter
provisions valid when they are reasonably related to probation-
ary goals.0 Some assert that when courts evaluate scarlet letter
8 See Tavill, supra note 5, at 624-34 (concluding scarlet letter conditions of pro-
bation may be unconstitutional when applied because they violate probationer's
freedom of speech, freedom of association, right to privacy, right to work, or because
they are cruel and unusual infliction of punishment); Erb, supra note 5, at 1166 ("it
would appear likely that the requirement that [probationer] post warning signs ...
as well as any similar unusual protection term, will be found valid... ."); James C.
Weissman, Constitutional Primer on Modern Probation Condition, 8 NEW ENG. J.
ON PRISON LAW 367, 373 (1982) ("Probation terms may jeopardize unlimited exercise
of basic constitutional liberties including fourth amendment freedom from unrea-
sonable search and seizure; first amendment freedoms of expression, association,
and religion; fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination; and other pro-
tected interests."). But cf Brilliant, supra note 4, at 1373-78 (discussing limitations
on judicial discretion to impose conditions of probation which makes independent
constitutional analysis impossible).
"9 See Massaro, supra note 5, at 1920 ("With some crimes, there is little doubt
that some offenders feel sincere shame, but do not stop their behavior."); Tavill, su-
pra note 5, at 644 (stating that scarlet letter probation condition neither protects
public nor rehabilitates offender). But see Kelley, supra note 5, at 788 (concluding
that scarlet letter probation conditions help offender to reform, keep criminal from
repeating offense by placing society and police on defense).
Discussing the merits of alternatives to incarceration, the Presidengfs Commis-
sion on Law Enforcement stated that reintegrating the offender into the community
is essential and that "a key element in this strategy is to deal with problems in their
social context, which means ... avoiding as much as possible the isolating and label-
ing effects of commitment to an institution." A-B.A. STANDARDS, supra note 2, at 22-
23 (quoting THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND AD-
MINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: CORRECTIONS 28 (1967)). It is sug-
gested that a sign which makes a DWI conviction a matter of pubic record and a
matter of public knowledge, may be at least as "labeling" as a prison term, which
would probably receive far less publicity than a DWI sign would generate.
40 CROMWELL, supra note 1, at 79 ("[C]onditions must be reasonably related to
the offender's needs and the protection of society and not arbitrary, capricious, or
beyond the ability of the offender to satisfy."); A.B.A. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL
JUSTICE §18-2.3(e)(iii)(2d ed. 1980) (articulating that conditions should be reasona-
bly related to purpose of sentencing, including goal of rehabilitation); Catherine Al-
biston, The Social Meaning of the Norplant Condition: Constitutional Considera-
tions of Race, Class, and Gender, 9 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 9, 40 (1994)
("Conditions of probation must be reasonable and must be directed toward the goals
of public safety."); Richard S. Gruner, Beyond Fines: Innovative Corporate Sentences
Under Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 261, 301 (1993) (declaring
that probation conditions must bear reasonable relationship to sentencing goals, in-
cluding rehabilitation, general deterrence, specific deterrence, and punishment).
But see Levine, supra, note 5 at 1862 ("The reasonableness standard requires that
the probation condition be not merely reasonably related to the purpose of proba-
tion, but that the condition be reasonable.").
For example, a "CONVICTED DWr" sign is uniquely related to the crime com-
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conditions, they should distinguish between offenders whose
conduct arouses near-universal hatred and revulsion, such as
sexual predators, and offenders who may inspire sympathy or
empathy, such as drunk drivers.41 When the offending conduct is
not viewed as particularly shameful, the stigma accompanying a
scarlet letter condition may be potentially less humiliating, yet
the public notification may result in the achievement of tradi-
tional probationary goals.42 Ultimately, however, requiring Let-
mitted, and arguably the knowledge that the police can easily identify his car may
make a probationer refrain from drinking if he drives. The Letterlough majority
found that the public punishment was not reasonably related to rehabilitation.
People v. Letterlough, 86 N.Y.2d 259, 655 N.E.2d 146, 150, 631 N.Y.S.2d 105 (1995).
41 Tavill, supra note 5, at 641-42. Tavill contrasted sex offender notification
provisions with the DWI notification required in Goldschmitt v. Florida, 490 So. 2d.
123 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986). Id. She concluded that a "CONVICTED DWI" bumper
sticker "is unlikely to have an effect upon any major aspects of the offender's life
given the general empathetic attitude of society toward drinking and driving." Id. at
642. In contrast, a sex offender notification requirement may actually encourage the
deviant behavior because of the stress placed on the offender. Id. at 641; cf People
v. Carolyn S., 92 Misc. 2d 674, 678, 401 N.Y.S.2d 141, 144 (Mount Vernon City Ct.
1977) (stating that when prescribing length of periods of probation, penal code dis-
tinguishes between probation term for petty and serious crimes). But see Kelley, su-
pra note 5, at 784-5 (asserting scarlet letter conditions are effective in preventing
both child molestation and drunk driving).
In his article, Brilliant distinguished between two types of probation conditions
for the same offense: 1) requiring a "CONVICTED DW1' bumper sticker and; 2) or-
dering offender to publish his picture and an apology in a newspaper. Brilliant, su-
pra note 4, at 1379-80. He considered the bumper sticker less stigmatic because the
offender could avoid humiliation by not driving, whereas the advertisement was
mandatory. Id. Although this may be true in theory, in reality few people who have
personal contact with an offender are likely to see or remember a newspaper ad,
while a bumper sticker may broadcast the conviction long after the offender has
ceased to engage in criminal conduct.
Both empathy and hypocrisy shape public attitudes toward drinking and driv-
ing, and it may be futile to try to predict whether Letterlough will be encouraged to
stay sober or ridiculed and "driven to drink." The sign may cause Letterlough's
neighbors and associates, who also drink and drive, to distinguish his behavior from
their own solely on the basis of his conviction.
42 See Brilliant, supra note 4, at 1379 (finding that although the bumper sticker
potentially subjects the defendant to humiliation, punitive aspect does not outweigh
strong rehabilitative or deterrent effects of condition). Arguably, different probation
conditions concerning the same less shameful offense might also have varying ef-
fects. Id. at 1379-80. Requiring Letterlough to place a non-stigmatizing sign on his
car might be more effective in achieving probationary goals and less punitive in na-
ture than the requirement that he advertise his conviction. Brilliant, supra note 4,
1379-80. Such a sign would remind Letterlough of his conviction, notify police of his
"CONVICTED DWI" status, and put him under heightened police scrutiny, without
branding him as a drunkard to his neighbors and associates. Id. In contrast, an ad-
vertisement only accomplishes probationary goals if the offender refrains from the
act to avoid the condition being imposed again. Id.
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terlough to affix a "CONVICTED DWI" sign was held to be pu-
nitive and not reasonably related to probationary goals because
it exposed him to heightened public scrutiny and disapproval
whether or not he actually refrained from drinking and driving."
The Letterlough holding should be construed narrowly so
as to prohibit only those probation conditions which stigmatize
the probationer. An expansive reading could have the effect of
discouraging judicial creativity and encouraging courts to in-
stead incarcerate offenders when the "permissible" probation
conditions enumerated in Penal Law section 65.10 do not seem to
fit the particular defendant's circumstances. By including a rea-
sonableness standard," the legislature intended to give the
courts discretion to experiment with personalized probation
conditions that may be effective when applied to each individual
defendant. The courts, therefore, should not be confined to rig-
idly prescribed rules of probation developed for the typical de-
fendant, which may not adequately address the rehabilitative
needs of the actual defendant being sentenced.
Dana Wordes
4 Letterlough, 86 N.Y.2d at 265-66, 655 N.E.2d at 150, 631 N.Y.S.2d at 108. In
fact, the punitive aspects of the sign become more obvious if its effect as a specific
deterrent is analyzed. If Letterlough ceases to drink and drive, and the sign is no
longer necessary to remind him or warn the public, its only consequence would be to
humiliate him. Conversely, if he continues to drink and drive, and the sign is inef-
fectual as a deterrent, the appropriate public safety measure would be to revoke his
license instead of merely advertising to the public that his driving presents a poten-
tial hazard.
Brilliant suggests that shaming a DWI offender into not driving at all is not
"ideally rehabilitative" but rather a circuitous way to achieve a result that can be
reached directly through revocation of the offender's license. See Brilliant, supra
note 4, at 1379.
"N.Y. PENAL LAW §65.10 (2)(1) (McKinney 1987).
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